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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

NOVEMBER 1985


CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #28




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* * *

PERSPECTIVE


In our judgment, the orderly completion of elections in Guatemala and Honduras last month marks an important initial step toward the strengthening of democratic institutions in those countries. International observers reported favorably on the conduct of the elections and the vote counting, and election losers made few claims of fraud. In both elections the military remained on the political sidelines, refusing to endorse specific candidates publicly during the campaigns and limiting their election day roles to maintaining public order. The high voter turnout in both countries reflects the failure of the extreme left to promote either boycotts or disruptions of the voting. 

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We note, however, that difficult political and economic times lie ahead for both new regimes. Most immediately, in Honduras a controversial electoral law that denies victory to the candidate who won the most popular votes has provoked a political conflict that could undermine the legitimacy of the new government. In Guatemala, we believe the lackluster campaign and failure to prepare the public for difficult economic times ahead may give the new government there a relatively short political honeymoon. 


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In Honduras, Liberal Party frontrunner Jose Azcona claimed victory under the

This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains information available as of 3 December 1985. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA, 

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

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[redacted]

disputed 1985 electoral reform law. Although Azcona ran 15 percent behind National Party leader Rafael Callejas, who garnered 42 percent of the total vote, the law gives victory to the party that wins the most votes. In the 24 November election, the four Liberal Party candidates collectively won 51 percent of the vote compared to 45 percent for the three candidates running under the National Party banner. In conflict with these electoral procedures, the Honduran constitution calls for the election of the President by a simple majority. [redacted]

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At the end of the month, the National Party appeared to be moving toward a constitutional challenge of the election procedures. Even though the US Embassy reported that before the vote Callejas publicly pledged--along with most of the other Presidential candidates--to abide by the voting outcome, many Nationalists appeared willing to file a case themselves if Callejas refused. [redacted]

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In addition, even after the elections Azcona and Callejas feared that President Suazo--who repeatedly has tried to postpone the transfer of power--was still seeking ways to block the inauguration on 27 January. A member of the National Party known to be sympathetic to Suazo already has petitioned the Supreme Court to rule the elections invalid, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

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The armed forces have remained intent on blocking any disruption of the election or transfer of power. In late October, the military decisively thwarted a Suazo effort to win Congressional approval for an election delay, according to the US Embassy. After the election, [redacted] that the high command showed no hesitancy--at least initially--in accepting Azcona's victory, although some senior officers privately preferred Callejas over him. We believe Armed Forces Chief Lopez and his top officers fear any sign of wavering in support of the election process would only encourage disgruntled politicians to challenge the results. [redacted]

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In Guatemala, the two major centrist parties captured nearly 60 percent of the vote as almost 70 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Christian Democratic candidate Vinizio Cerezo ran far ahead of the 8-man field, defeating his nearest rival, Jorge Carpio of the National Centrist Union, by 18 percentage points. In the 100-member congressional race, the Christian Democrats took 51 seats to 22 for Carpio's party. [redacted]

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In our judgment, the biggest election losers were the far right parties and the leftist insurgents. The six rightist parties won only 24 percent of the vote and 14 congressional seats, far below preelection expectations. We believe that Cerezo's strong showing in traditional strongholds of the extreme rightist National Liberation Movement Party underscored its declining popularity and the inability of the right to overcome its factionalism. On the left, the insurgents failed to follow through on earlier promises to carry out terrorist campaigns or to disrupt the elections. [redacted]

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The US Embassy reported that the runoff campaign has been low key and that no major issues or disputes have surfaced. Cerezo's near electoral sweep coupled with Carpio's inability to forge an anti-Cerezo coalition have dampened interest in the December runoff. [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

Cerezo has begun focusing on selection of his cabinet and meeting with key private sector and political leaders. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] he hopes to reach an early accommodation with the military on potentially contentious issues such as the counterinsurgency campaign, the status of civilian defense patrols, and civilian control over the military in general. Although Cerezo privately has recognized the severity of Guatemala's economic problems in discussions with the US Embassy, there is little evidence that he plans to take quick and decisive steps on this matter after his inauguration. [redacted] 25X1

* * *

NICARAGUA

Regime harassment of domestic opponents continued under the expanded state of emergency. In early November, according to the US Embassy, the Sandinistas publicly stated that the crackdown was aimed at the Church and civic opposition, which were accused of undercutting the government's efforts to defeat the insurgency. Interior Minister Borge, in an interview with a West European journalist, repeated this rationale in mid-November, stating that Cardinal Obando y Bravo is the "ideological twin" of President Reagan and that the regime would use the decree to "neutralize" him. To demonstrate its ability to cow the opposition, the government, in a flurry of moves:

- Detained and interrogated more than 40 political and business leaders, priests and religious workers, opposition press officials, and local employees of the US Embassy.
- Required the independent human rights commission to submit all letters and reports for censorship.
- Tightened censorship of the independent newspaper La Prensa and barred its journalists from some government meetings.
- Canceled the radio program of a small opposition party, which then threatened to withdraw from the National Assembly. [redacted] 25X1

Despite these intimidation tactics, opposition to the decree has persisted. Five of the opposition parties in the National Assembly condemned the measures in early November, and the government rescinded some of the minor restrictions to mute criticism. At least one of the parties decided to back out of regime-sponsored discussions of the draft constitution until civil liberties are restored. The head of the Social Christian Party told US Embassy officials in mid-November that he was considering leaving the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Board--the main civic opposition coalition--because its current leadership was not doing enough to oppose the regime. Cardinal Obando y Bravo continued to tour the country celebrating well-attended masses--one in Ocotal drew over 3,000--and he sent a private appeal to the Presidents of key Latin American and West European countries asking them to pressure the Sandinistas to restore the Nicaraguans' legal rights, according to the US Embassy. The head of the leading private sector organization told the Embassy he intends to hold a series of meetings throughout Nicaragua to discuss regime policies. [redacted] 25X1

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Meanwhile, Nicaragua's economic downturn continued. According to US Embassy surveys, living standards for low- and middle-income families declined further as basic staple prices rose 6 to 9 percent. Censored Managua press reporting points to more layoffs of government workers, an increase in bankruptcies, and labor dissatisfaction with government policies, including several strikes by workers in proregime unions. Shortages persist in some workers' commissaries as suppliers shift their goods to the more lucrative black market, according to US Embassy reporting. For their part, the Sandinistas continue to blame the situation on the insurgency and the US embargo. [redacted]

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On the military front, fighting intensified both in the central and northern parts of the country. [redacted] press reporting indicate rebel operations in Chontales Department threatened the vital arms route between Rama and Managua. At mid-month, according to [redacted] insurgents attacked and held a small town west of Rama for several hours and ambushed government vehicles on the road nearby. The Sandinistas admitted the deaths of 30 troops, and we believe fatalities may have been substantially higher. More than a dozen Sandinista fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters strafed and rocketed rebels who had attacked an Army post at Santo Domingo. The air attacks reportedly caused heavy insurgent casualties and also wounded at least eight civilians and two Sandinista soldiers.

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EL SALVADOR

With his daughter's kidnaping behind him, President Duarte turned his attention to restoring his political credibility and mending fences with the military. Politically, the President's most serious challenge came from a number of public sector strikes that were not resolved until month's end. Military activity remained relatively light, but the armed forces did mount a number of actions, including a major airstrike against rebel strongholds in the Guazapa volcano area where Duarte's daughter had been held. Amid signs of a new wave of kidnaping and urban terrorism, [redacted] insurgent efforts focused largely on fomenting labor unrest and mobilizing support for the creation by year end of the "National Forum," a broadbased leftist umbrella group. [redacted]

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The outbreak of strikes that included workers in the telecommunications, agriculture, public works, and tourism ministries were in part the result of insurgent agitation aimed at challenging Duarte's leadership as well as winning economic benefits, [redacted] Union demands included the dismissal of government managers, wage increases, and the release of jailed leftist activists. [redacted] preparations for the "National Forum" to focus attention on political dialogue were well under way among various front organizations, including those in the universities. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Duarte administration is well aware of the threat that labor unrest poses, and we believe the administration may be rethinking previously reported austerity plans. In a late November nationwide speech, the President

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[REDACTED]

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avoided mention of future austerity measures even though he had addressed the issue in general terms in a speech only the day before. Instead, he blamed the country's economic ills on the insurgents while acknowledging that many of labor's demands were just. He also announced a salary increase for public employees and the military and a Christmas bonus for all public sector employees; according to Duarte; this package will cost the government about \$53 million. At the same time, he indicated that he would not hesitate to use the security forces to maintain order and end what he believes to be illegal strikes. [REDACTED]

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The military High Command continued to promise reforms and new procedures to improve armed forces' performance and better integrate civilian and military counterinsurgency strategies. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The High Command also reportedly is planning to reassign several senior commanders--including the controversial Colonel Ochoa--before the end of the year. [REDACTED]

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Overall, military activity remained generally light last month, but the Salvadoran armed forces did mount several relatively large air operations. Most notably, the Air Force launched an airstrike--followed a day later by the deployment of 80 airborne troops--against guerrilla strongholds in the Guazapa area north of San Salvador. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Although the Air Force is claiming the action a success, some officers complained that the delay in deploying ground troops--a persistent problem--allowed the rebels to avoid more significant casualties and reduced chances of capturing the local guerrilla headquarters. [REDACTED]

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In another operation in early November, the US-trained Atonal Battalion and the Sixth Brigade attacked and overran five insurgent base camps in Usulután. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] government forces suffered 26 casualties, largely as a result of guerrilla mines. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicates that rebel mines continue to cause casualties for the armed forces, and to affect morale seriously in some units. [REDACTED]

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No progress was made in resolving the late October kidnaping of Air Force Colonel Avalos, although the insurgents publicly took credit for his abduction; claiming that it was a legitimate act of war. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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PANAMA

Anti-military sentiment continued to run high in November, although the public outcry following the murder of Hugo Spadafora and the ouster of former President Barletta began to die down. Several prominent figures called for a "national dialogue" among the Defense Forces and political parties to resolve differences on such issues as military involvement in national affairs, human rights, and government corruption. According to the US Embassy, Panamanian Archbishop McGrath indicated his willingness to mediate the talks. President Delvalle, however, dismissed the idea, no doubt reflecting the attitude of Defense Chief Noriega. [REDACTED]

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After months of delay, on 31 October the government signed an agreement with international commercial banks for a \$60 million new loan, with the first tranche scheduled for disbursement by year's end. The US Embassy reports, however, that the Delvalle administration has postponed and may even cancel reform efforts--jeopardizing the three 1986 drawings, which are tied to economic policy changes. [REDACTED]

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COSTA RICA

Relations with Nicaragua remained a key campaign issue as both parties headed for elections in February. During November, the opposition party's lead evaporated, and the ruling party's candidate, Oscar Arias, according to a recent poll, has moved slightly ahead but with some 20 percent of the electorate still undecided. According to the US Embassy, Rafael Angel Calderon's Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) had conducted a well-organized, issue-oriented campaign and appeared to have the advantage of the Costa Rican tradition of voting against the incumbent party. [REDACTED] the ruling National Liberation Party (PLN) has turned the Nicaragua issue--once a major PUSC theme--against Calderon to depict him as a warmonger. In addition, President Monge bolstered the PLN's image as the "peace" party, according to Embassy reporting, by reintroducing legislation to codify his two-year-old neutrality policy. [REDACTED]

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REGIONAL PEACE TALKS

Despite two high-level rounds of discussions, there was no progress toward reaching an accord during November. Early in the month, the Sandinistas linked their acceptance of any Contadora treaty to direct actions by Washington to reduce its activities in the region and launched a press campaign to "prove" that the US, with Honduran assistance, was training guerrillas near Tegucigalpa. Soon after, President Ortega announced that, given the US role in the war, Nicaragua would not agree to reductions in its armed forces--a key provision in the Contadora draft treaty--until Washington agreed in writing to halt its support for the insurgency. The Sandinistas also demanded a total ban on international military maneuvers and suggested that any treaty be in force for only five years. The announcement coincided with the opening of

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economic assistance talks between the European Community, the five Central American countries, and the Contadora nations--Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama. 

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While frustration among participants in the talks has continued to increase, we see little likelihood that either the mediators or the Central Americans will abandon the negotiations soon. The self-imposed November deadline for an agreement was extended for another 30 days into late December. Even if the talks were to collapse, both sides would probably agree to shift negotiations to another setting, such as the UN, and perhaps to broaden participation rather than abandon the search for a settlement and risk an expanded US military presence in the region. 

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NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILDUP

30 October

Analysis by the US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center of a recent photograph of the Nicaraguan MI-25 HIND helicopter indicates it is armed with two twin-barrel 23-mm cannon gun pods, in addition to its normal weapons complement--chin-mounted 12.7-mm four barrel Gatlin gun, two 32-shot air-to-ground rocket pods, and launch rails for four antitank missiles.

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31 October

Sandinista Air Force assets apparently include at least 11 MI-25 helicopter gunships and 14 MI-8/17 medium lift helicopters, according to photography.


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six have been identified in imagery as MI-17s.

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5 November

over 120 military-associated vehicles delivered by a Soviet merchant ship to Corinto. Six heavy-lift transporters were also observed, but it is not known whether they were part of this delivery or relocated to transport heavy equipment off the Nicaraguan ship Carlos Fonseca Amador.

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9 November

Overhead photography indicates Nicaraguan merchant ship Carlos Fonseca Amador began unloading operations at Corinto with no discernible arms transshipment activity or unusual security precautions.

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
11 November

Imagery shows MI-8 helicopter on the quay at El Bluff,

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


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
18 November

Photography reveals fifth early-warning radar site at Cerro
Penas Blancas. 

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SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS

November 1985

Late October


Soviet Bloc countries promise to boost economic and technical aid to Nicaragua during second annual meeting of CEMA-Nicaragua Mixed Commission. 

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11-12 November


Foreign Ministers from EC, Central American, and Contadora nations meet in Luxembourg to sign economic cooperation accord and discuss political declaration supporting Contadora negotiations and observance of human rights. 

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Late November

Contadora draft resolution urging US and Nicaragua to return to Manzanillo-style dialogue debated at UN General Assembly. 

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[Redacted]

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NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY

During November, insurgent political and military leaders began aggressively instructing troops on human rights issues and systematically reporting and publicizing Sandinista human rights abuses. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Managua archdiocese officially opened its human rights office under the direct control of Cardinal Obando y Bravo. Meanwhile, regime security officials, using the state of emergency decreed in October, stepped up pressure on anti-regime political and religious leaders and harassed Nicaraguan employees of the US Embassy. [Redacted]

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Alleged Insurgent Abuses

[Redacted]

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4 November

The proregime press, citing reports from some of the 212 insurgents who allegedly accepted amnesty, accuses the rebels of forcibly recruiting combatants from refugee camps in Honduras. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

8 November

A proregime radio broadcast accuses KISAN Indian rebels of capturing and beating five state employees who were accompanying Indian civilians back to their village along the Atlantic Coast. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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14 November

The proregime press reports testimony by a member of a teachers' brigade, who had allegedly escaped from an FDN camp, that rebels raped her and then raped and murdered her four companions after kidnaping them nearly 10 months ago. 


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17 November

The Nicaragua News Agency reports the testimony of two former guerrillas who claim that the rebels routinely murdered peasants. 


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18 November

Regime officials claim the rebels are responsible for the deaths of nearly 900 farmers during the last 20 months, according to the proregime press. 


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19 November

The proregime press reports testimony from 45 peasants from border areas who claim to have been kidnaped by rebels and forced to serve in combat units. 

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20 November


Sandinista officials claim that rebels killed eight civilians, including a child, during an attack on the town of Santo Domingo in central Nicaragua. 

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28 November

In their weekly combat report, the Sandinistas accuse the rebels of kidnaping, wounding, or killing nearly 15 civilians and attacking two farm cooperatives in Boaco Department, according to US Embassy reporting. 


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Alleged Sandinista Abuses

1 November

According to press reports, United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) opens an office in Geneva to lobby UN human rights groups to oppose Sandinista political repression under the state of emergency. 

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
4 November

The US Embassy reports comments from local UN officials that many of the guerrillas who accept amnesty are interrogated by security officials and often have difficulty finding jobs. 

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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8 November

Proregime press tries to discredit the statements of a former Sandinista security official implicating Interior Minister Borge in the executions of hundreds of Nicaraguan dissidents. [REDACTED]

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8-20 November

Various press and US Embassy reports point to intensified regime harassment of political opponents, including interrogations and brief detention of dissident political and religious officials, as well as Nicaraguan employees of the US Embassy. A journalist for the independent newspaper La Prensa was held briefly, and security officials ordered the independent human rights organization to submit its reports for approval by censors. [REDACTED]

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16 November

Speakers at a meeting of the newly formed independent bar association criticize the regime for systematically abusing human rights and due process in Nicaragua, according to US Embassy reporting. [REDACTED]

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18 November

The head of the opposition Social Christian Party reports that over 300 party members and their relatives are being held by state security. One person detained by the Army is found dead. [REDACTED]

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19 November

The regime orders the closing of a radio station, run by an opposition party, allegedly for speaking out against conscription. [REDACTED]

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21 November

A recently expelled religious activist tells the US Embassy in Lima he spoke with a US citizen being held incommunicado in a Nicaraguan jail. [REDACTED]

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22 November

Rebel leader Eden Pastora reports that Sandinistas executed several peasants, including an 11-year-old boy, for allegedly aiding the insurgents, according to press reports. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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





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


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NICARAGUAN TRIPS/VISITS

November 1985

29 October	Vice President Ramirez visits Brazil seeking technical and cultural cooperation and financial support. 	25X1
30 October	Insurgent leader Eden Pastora visits Panama City in effort to gain Catholic Church assistance in obtaining contributions from wealthy Panamanians. 	25X1
Early November	Portuguese labor delegation visits Managua prior to Conference on Peace and Democracy held in San Jose. 	25X1
17 November	Nicaraguan Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock meets with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez and Swedish Prime Minister Palme in Madrid. 	25X1
17-22 November	Foreign Minister D'Escoto travels to Luxembourg for EC/Central American meeting, then on to India, New Zealand, and Australia. 	25X1
18-21 November	Leaders of Nicaraguan civic opposition visit Washington, D.C. 	25X1








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
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COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING DECEMBER

Early December	Nicaraguan Minister of External Cooperation Henry Ruiz to lead delegation to People's Republic of China. 	25X1
2-6 December	OAS General Assembly meets in Cartagena, Colombia. 	25X1
8 December	Guatemalan Presidential candidates Vinicio Cerezo and Jorge Carpio face each other in runoff. 	25X1
10 December	Deadline for Honduras and El Salvador to resolve their border dispute, according to provisions of 1980 treaty. 	25X1
18-22 December	Private visit to US by President Duarte.	
December	Annual promotion and reassignment cycle for Salvadoran officer corps. 	25X1

CHRONOLOGY OF ARMS FLOW INTO EL SALVADOR

Nothing to Report




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
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- 79 - MCD Files
- 80 - CAN Files
- 81 - CAS Files

25X1

DDI/ALA/MC/CAS (1 November 1985)

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